A growing number of NATO countries suspended compulsory military service during the past decade or are now phasing it out, moving to an All Volunteer Force (AVF). An AVF can free resources available for investment in up-to-date equipments, thus improving operational capabilities. Our paper investigates shifts in NATO military expenditure shares on personnel, equipment, infrastructure and other costs over the period 1970-2008 and explores the impact of the transition to AVFs on these shares of the defence budget. Results suggest that while the end of conscription did not reduce the share of spending on personnel, NATO forces are increasingly less reliant on soldiers and more on capital.
Introduction
Since the Cold War ended, sixteen of NATO's twenty-six member states have suspended compulsory military service, while others are phasing it out, joining the US, Canada, the UK and Luxembourg in the group of All-Volunteer Forces (AVF, see Table 1 ). The transition to smaller professional militaries has reduced the intake of troops and has forced military organisations to shift their cost structure to eliminate labour priced below the market.
This paper examines the effect of moving from conscription to volunteers on the shares of military budget devoted to personnel, equipment, infrastructure and other costs. To the best of our knowledge, a disaggregated analysis of NATO defence expenditure components has never been done before. Since ending conscription tends to have two effects that go in opposite directions, fewer soldiers paid higher wages, it is not obvious what is the net effect on personnel cost. This is something that has to be determined from the data. This is an important issue since recruiting an adequate number of young citizens on an annual basis is crucial for the armed forces, particularly for those actively deployed in operations abroad. NATO countries are among the main peacekeeping contributors and aspire to keep a global military presence around the world. The rising number of casualties and decreasing domestic support for ongoing operations underline the importance of volunteers' recruitment and high-technology equipment acquisition, if NATO is to maintain its military at the required level. Due to the high cost of weapons and the defence budget cuts, NATO members can no longer afford to fight today's wars while insisting on the acquisition of top-end equipment.
Although the economic, demographic, labour, and social context at the time All Volunteer Forces (AVF) policy is introduced varies among NATO countries, section 2 identifies some common factors determining the suspension of conscription. Section 3 describes the extent to which military personnel and physical inputs have been substitutable for each other in NATO armed forces during the transition to AVF. Section 4 sets up a simple model to determine the demand function of each component of military expenditure and to derive the econometric specification. We represent the military possibility frontier as a transcendental logarithmic production function with four inputs. This allows the indirect estimation of the drivers of the input prices through a translog cost function with symmetry. Section 5 describes our dataset. Section 6 presents and interprets the empirical results. They suggest that while the abolition of conscription did not lower personnel costs as a share of the defence budget, it has led to a more pronounced technological emphasis and an increased dependence on infrastructure. Section 7 draws some policy-relevant implications.
Moving to an All-Volunteer Force
Since the supply and demand for military personnel are subject to the forces of the labour market, economists played a key role in the conscription debate. For example, the decision to move to an AVF in the US was a policy reform supported by persuasive economic arguments. This is discussed in Altman & Barro (1971) ; Oi (1967) ; Altman & Fechter (1967) . Moving to an AVF system has been justified by three main arguments: it is an inequitable tax on conscripts; a higher personnel retention rate; and a changing post-Cold War geostrategic environment.
Conscripts are usually paid less that their alternative wage plus compensation for loss of civilian life and it is costly to prevent evasion of conscription (Warner & Negrusa, 2005) . Performance incentives under a conscription system are usually negative, often taking the form of punishment. Thus maintaining a minimum degree of compliance may become costly. The need to recruit volunteers usually improves the conditions of military life. AVF systems often provide benefits such as training and post-service education, health care and pensions to attract and retain high-quality staff.
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The second argument recognises that AVFs efficiency comes also from a higher personnel retention rate. Indeed, for the military, the employment of volunteers is more cost-effective due to longer terms of service (and thus higher skill levels, lower personnel turnover, less demand for new recruits and reduced training costs). Retention policies normally include a contractual commitment, usually a fixed-term contract that covers the initial training and a subsequent period of employment. NATO members are active contributors to peace and crisis management operations around the world. This requires cost-effective expeditionary capabilities and quick deployability to respond to crises. While conscripts may be precluded from out-of-area missions by law, the AVF model with a high retention rate is better suited to rapid response in crisis.
For the Central and Eastern European member states there are also geostrategic considerations playing into their decision to shift to an AVF system. In the new post-Cold War security environment, the prospect of collective defence and the integration into NATO for missions around the world made military downsizing possible. Moreover, alliance leaders considered sizeable conscript forces as a vestige of the Cold War.
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There are also arguments in favour of conscription, mainly budgetary considerations. Although the Cold War was followed by a reduction in military budgets and a cut in the number of uniformed troops serving, the level of military pay necessary to make the military career competitive and the costs to train longer-serving volunteer is higher than when conscription was in place. Attracting and keeping high-quality personnel has been a chal-lenge for the military in Western countries, since the end of compulsory service. As a result of greater private-sector opportunities, the military has had to adjust salaries to match those in the private-sector (e.g. Williams, 2005; Hosek & Sharp, 2001) . As the supply curve is not perfectly elastic, to attract or retain more people, remuneration has to be increased. Higher military compensations might eventually trade off with military research and development.
Moreover, a government budget under strain results in a decline in the personnel budget or a reduction in the force size. The Stability and Growth Pact has imposed limits on European countries, increasing the pressure to reduce the defence spending as well as the budget allocated for military personnel. This drop in military pay has three important effects. Firstly, it results in lower entry standards. Warner & Asch (1995) use post ColdWar market factors affecting the supply of military personnel (e.g. relative military pay, recruiting goals, enlistment incentives and unemployment) to estimate how those factors, and hence the state of the civilian economy, affect high-quality enlistment. They argue that high-quality military recruitment is sensitive to business cycles and to attendance to post-secondary education. More generally, recruiting and retention plummet during economic booms. Secondly, while conscription promotes social integration, in low remunerated AVF systems, social minorities are usually over-represented. As a result the social make-up of the armed forces do not present an accurate picture of society-at-large.
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Finally, a drop in military pay can result in a decline in retention (Warner et al. , 2008) .
Factor substitution
The end of the Cold War has dramatically reduced the number of new recruits. Figure 1 shows the drop in the number of military personnel as percentage of the national labour force. This remarkable reduction was particularly pronounced in the decade 1990-2000, due to a changing geopolitical situation. The end of the Cold War has also prompted a number of European countries to phase out conscription. The consequent decline in the availability of surplus troops has resulted in an increased cost of labour. Moreover, a long-term technological trend has reduced the demand for raw numbers and increased the premium for skills. As the technical skills required in the military organisations have become more demanding, more time and funding are invested to provide adequate training to a restricted number of personnel to operate high-technology equipments.
Factor substitution can be seen in the relative trends of the shares of the defence budget. We disaggregate the defence expenditure into four components. (i) The share of expenditures on personnel, which includes the com-pensation of military and civilian personnel (e.g. basic pay, allowances for food and housing and the pension). Following the NATO definition, military personnel also includes paramilitary units (e.g. the French Gendarmerie).
(ii) The share of expenditures on equipment (e.g. troop outfitting, armed equipments, research and development). (iii) The share of expenditures on infrastructure (e.g. military bases, airfield and communications). (iv) A residual shares of expenditures, which includes operations and maintenance (e.g. fuel). Table 4 shows the evolution of these shares of the defence budget. Figures are five-year averages computed at the beginning and at the end of the period considered in this study : 1970-74 and 2004-08 . The recent trend reveals more technological emphasis in the defence expenditure. With few exceptions, countries with an AVF model generally devote a smaller share of their budget to personnel expenditures and a larger share to the purchase of new equipments than countries still retaining a conscription model do. Germany has a compulsory 9-month conscription, resulting in a higher than average expenditure on personnel. Belgium and Italy are the only exceptions within the sample, their budget shows increasing shares devoted to personnel. However, Italy ended conscription in 2005 and is still in a transitional phase.
Anticipated savings from the suspension of conscription may not materialise as soon as predicted due to the presence of programs protecting civilian employees. These programmes delay the close-down of redundant military bases. Moreover, because the transition to an AVF system is gradual, it might show effects opposite to those expected. In the US, for example, during the first few years of the AVF implementation, the share of military spending devoted to personnel rose, despite a reduction in the size of the armed forces. However, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions, since the AVF transition for the US occurred during the withdrawal from Vietnam.
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Netherlands and Belgium show the same pattern and suggest an increase in the spending on personnel after the AVF advent. Overall, Table 5 shows a reduction in military expenditures after the end of the conscription system. Dunne et al. (2008) group empirical studies on the determinants of military spending into arms race models and those studies focusing on a range of economic, political and strategic determinants of military spending. We are not concerned with explaining the level of military spending but with the choice of inputs into it.
Theoretical model
We start with a twice differentiable aggregate military production function, relating a defence output Y to four inputs: personnel, x P , equipment x E , infrastructure, x I and other costs, x O . We assume that the technological progress is Hicks-neutral (i.e. it does not affect the inputs' balance). The corresponding cost function may be written as
where M is the total cost as a function of the four input prices and output. A sufficiently flexible specification can be envisaged as a nonhomothetic translog cost function following from a second-order Taylor's series approximation in logarithms to an arbitrary cost function (Berndt, 1991) . In nonhomothetic specifications, the ratios of cost-minimising inputs demand are allowed to depend on the level of output. For our four inputs model, we write the translog cost function as
The conditions for symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in the input prices are
The translog cost function can be expressed in terms of the cost-minimising input demand equations transformed into cost share equations. If one logarithmically differentiates (1) with respect to input prices and then employs the Shephard's Lemma
one obtains cost share equations of the form
where M is the total cost (i.e. M = j p j x j ). w j is the cost share of each input in the total cost of producing output Y, which we proxy by real military expenditure (M/p), where p is a general price index. The input prices are a particular problem in this context because they are not available from any source. However, since input prices are affected by some general costs (e.g. inflation, interest rates, labour cost), we can use these general drivers of input prices to determine the demand function. Assuming that any input price can be specified as:
where C h is a cost driver, the shares of military expenditure will be expressed as:
The dependent variables are the j shares (j = P, E, I, O) of the four components of military expenditure, C h are the n drivers of input prices, M/p is the real defence expenditure. Notice that the price coefficients themselves are not recoverable, so we cannot impose homogeneity or symmetry. Adding up will hold automatically by the properties of least squares, i.e. j α j = 1, j δ jh = j β j = 0, however the translog system does not guarantee that the predicted shares will lie between zero and one.
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For estimation, we have data for countries i = 1, 2, ...13 for time periods t = 1970 − 2008. We add a disturbance assumed to be homoskedastic and serially uncorrelated; we assume that the intercepts, α ji , differ by country, allowing the direct effect of prices to differ, but that the cross-price effects are similar across countries, giving homogeneous slopes and also allow for unobserved global cost or technology shocks, α jt . This gives the 2-way fixed effect estimating equations
Equation 6 is a static model, which can be interpreted as capturing the long-run equilibrium. Shocks, depreciation, slow adjustment and expectations would induce dynamic elements. Introducing dynamics into panel complete demand systems involves some complications and is left as topic for future research.
Data
We collected series of disaggregated military expenditures expressed as a share of the defence budget for 14 NATO countries. Using the shares adjusts for inflation changes and defence expenditure growth. Hence, the figures are directly comparable among countries. The shares also reflect national governments' priorities for their armed forces and are a major source of debate in budget planning.
The shares of the defence budget on personnel and equipment originate from NATO reports and have been subsequently assembled and processed by the Division of Defence Analysis at the Swedish Defence Ministry. The share on infrastructure is subtracted from the "residual" series from the NATO-SIPRI dataset and gaps years are filled in by the growth rates of the "residual" series. Whenever possible, we compare overlapping years from the NATO dataset, the Military Balance and SIPRI to check the consistency of our series across different sources. These are the best data available on the components of military expenditures, but because countries may not define the components in exactly the same way they are likely to be subject to measurement errors.
The cost drivers used are the nominal interest rate, inflation rate, log percapita GDP (as a measure of labour cost). These data are taken from the the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) database. The analysis is applied to 13 NATO members. Initially Turkey was included in the analysis, but the assumption of slope homogeneity proved much less plausible when Turkey was included. Turkey is a developing economy in which the economic and political weight of the armed forces differs from that of NATO's Western members. For these reasons, Turkey would require a separate analysis.
Empirical results
To investigate the impact of the transition to AVFs on the balance between military expenditure on personnel, equipment and infrastructure, we use a two-way fixed effect model (2-way FE), which is preferred among a variety of specifications according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for model selection.
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We compare the model with the 1-way FE model in Table 8 . The 2-way FE estimates are shown in Table 6 .
The time period considered in this analysis is 1970-2008, determined by available data. Clearly, Europe experienced important structural changes during this period. Among these, the end of the Cold War triggered major readjustments in military expenditures in European armed forces. The time effects in the 2-way FE specification allows for specific year effects. However, the slopes may differ between the Cold War period and the subsequent period. We test this possibility by comparing models fitted over the whole period against those fitted over the two sub-periods (Table 8 ). We present the 2-way FE model estimated in the two sub-periods in Table 7 .
In the baseline 2-way FE model over the whole period ; Table  6 ) the AVF dummy has a significant impact on the share of equipment and infrastructure. The suspension of conscription seems to reduce the share of expenditure on equipment while it increases the share on infrastructure.
Although not statistically significant, the AVF system has the effect of increasing the share of expenditure on personnel. The positive sign of the coefficient suggests that professional forces do not lower personnel costs.
There is evidence that real interest rate is an important driver of defence spending allocations. The estimates show that the share of expenditure on infrastructure and other costs are sensitive to real interest rate while the share on personnel is more responsive to inflation changes.
In Table 6 , log per-capita GDP, the proxy for labour cost, despite not being statistically significant, has the expected sign. The lack of significance might be due to the choice of the proxy. Probably the most interesting finding is that, as labour cost increases, there is a greater emphasis on equipment and infrastructure and less reliance on soldiers.
The defence expenditure elasticity of personnel is significantly less than unity. As defence expenditure increases, the share on personnel rises less than proportionately. On the contrary, equipment and infrastructure show an income elasticity greater than one. High technological equipment and viable infrastructure are vital to NATO missions and operation efficacy. The results show that, as the defence budget increases, the emphasis on technology increases more than proportionately.
The model selection criteria suggest that there is evidence of a break in the relationship. The end of the Cold War triggered major changes in the strategic environment and in the structure and organisation of NATO forces. The fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) is commonly considered as the watershed to mark these changes. Certainly, some of the structural changes began before 1989; some others took place only later. Table 8 shows the values of the maximised log-likelihood (MLL), the AIC and the BIC considering a break in 1989. A 1-way fixed effect and a 2-way fixed effect specification are estimated for the whole period and for two sub-periods split in 1989 (1970-1989; 1990-2008) . For both specifications, the model accounting for the two sub-periods is preferred.
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We take into account the 1989 break by estimating a 2-way FE model over two sub-periods, before the end of the Cold War (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) and after the end of the Cold War (1990 War ( -2008 . The estimates are shown in Table 7 . There are some major differences between the two periods. In the first period, there are stronger defence expenditure elasticities. The defence expenditure elasticities of equipment, infrastructure and other costs are greater than one, reflecting the arms races in technology and nuclear power typical of the Cold War period. In the second period, as budget increases, the emphasis on infrastructure and other costs persists, but the estimates of this sensitivity have smaller sizes. In the second period, the importance of the labour cost becomes more relevant. As labour cost increases, the share of expenditure on personnel decreases while the share on other costs increases.
In the first period, the AVF dummy is strongly significant for the share on personnel, infrastructure and other costs. This reflects the US move to AVF as no other transitions occurred in that period. In the second period, the AVF dummy has no significant effect on any of these shares. The pattern is the one emerging in the whole period and described above: the AVF model of recruitment does not lower personnel costs.
In the model presented in Table 6 there is an issue of endogeneity of military expenditure. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the hypothesis of exogeneity of the defence budget for personnel and other costs when instrumenting military expenditure with one lag of military expenditure. There are several reasons why military expenditure might be correlated with the residuals of the demand system. A static system can be interpreted as a two stage budgeting, where the first stage determines the total military budget and the second stage determines the allocation of the budget among categories within the period. If intertemporal country preferences are correlated with individual shocks in the demand system, the residuals of the demand system will be correlated with the allocation of spending over time and hence with the budget variable. For instance, countries willing to project their power through the deployment of soldiers abroad, they might have a larger military budget as well as a high share of military personnel. Another reason for the possible correlation between the residuals and (log) military expenditure is the presence of measurement errors. Since data are taken from different sources, this possibility is likely to arise. Exogeneous variation in this context should come from a variable that explains the variability of the military budget while being uncorrelated with a country's shock (e.g. strategic considerations, organisational preferences) and/or measurement error. Addressing the issue of endogenous military expenditure is a topic for further research. The estimates can be interpreted as the best linear unbiased predictors of the expenditure shares conditional on military expenditures.
Conclusion
There is a tendency for NATO members to rely progressively more on volunteers to fill their military ranks. While in the past, conventional wars required mass conscript armies, modern peace operations require wellequipped, mobile, professional, rapid response forces. These forces should also be able to plan preventive actions, including intense combat operations. By seeking to reform their armed forces, NATO members are paying increasing attention to the procurement of new military technologies and to the development of special operations forces and light-and medium-sized military units. To this end, the AVF model is required for a flexible and high-technology military.
Our results suggest that NATO forces are increasingly less reliant on soldiers and more on capital. However, the end of conscription did not reduce the share of spending on personnel. Views of the appropriate balance between military personnel and physical inputs vary across the alliance. The personnel downsizing in the period 1989-2008 has created several challenges, resulting in severe staff imbalances and costs higher than planned. The existence of a transition period indicates that the expected improvements will not be visible for some years following the elimination of the conscription system. This might result in temporary higher costs of personnel, which might drain resources otherwise needed for the acquisition of new equipment and its maintenance. Certainly, the quality of new recruits will be fundamental to match the skills required to operate out-of-area missions and maintain increasingly high-technology equipments.
Military manpower is the primary instrument of military power, therefore understanding how the increasing cost of labour has affected the substitution of labour for capital and the retention of trained individual is fundamental to assess NATO capabilities in the near future. To this end, there is an increasing need of economic studies to inform policies related to the AVF in the future. 7 SIPRI provides estimates of real defence expenditures in million USD in constant 2005 prices and constant exchange rate. These are made compatible with the earlier series expressed in constant 1995 prices. Using a constant exchange rate assumes that PPP holds. To transform the series in constant prices, SIPRI deflates the military expenditure expressed in local currency by a local price index. Local price indexes might be poor approximations of the evolution of military prices. However, there is no available index for military prices.
8 The 2-way FE model is superior to the Pooled OLS model and the 1-way FE model. The 2-way FE allows for more flexible estimates since it allows the constants to vary. However, it imposes the equality of slopes and variances. Heterogeneity in slopes might be an issue. If slopes are heterogenous, the fixed effect model produces unbiased estimates of the average effects, provided that the differences in coefficients are independent of the regressors.
9 According to the BIC, estimating two separate sub-periods leads to the selection of the 2-way FE model. AIC selects the 2-way FE model for the share on infrastructure and other cost and the 1-way FE model for the share on personnel and equipment. Since the differences are very small, we select a 2-way FE specification and we estimate the relationship accounting for the break in 1989. The estimates are shown in Table 7 . Armed Forces, % of labour force B e lg iu m C a n a d a D e n m a r k G e r m a n y G r e e c e I t a ly L u x e m b o u r g N e t h e r la n d N o r w e y P o r t u g a l S p a in T u r k e y U K U S A 1970-1974 2004-2008 1970-1974 2004-2008 1970-1974 2004-2008 1970-1974 2004- Notes: Labour cost is proxied by log GDP per capita; Milex is log of real military expenditure in constant US dollars. The CPI is used to adjust for inflation. AVF is a binary variable equal to 0 over the years in which conscription was in place, equal to 1 in the AVF years. ρ is the fraction of variance due to the country effect. MLL is the maximised loglikelihood. Time effect indicators are included but not reported. The test of their joint significance is reported in the row 'Time effect' followed by the test p-values. CSD is the test for cross-sectional dependence following the methods by Pesaran (2004) and by Friedman (1937) . AIC is the Akaike information criterion; BIC is the Bayesian information criterion. Notes: see Table 6 for variable and apex description. 
